CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VIETNAM WAR

MORATORIUM-BOARD

OF EDUCATION DISALLOWED TO AUTHORIZE ABSENCES FOR PARTIC-

Board of Education, 304 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. Richmond Cty. 1969).

IPATION IN MORATORIUM ACTIVITIEs-Nistad v.

On October 8, 1969, the Board of Education of the City of New
York issued a statement concerning the proposed Vietnam War Moratorium to be held on October 15, 1969. The Board said that it and
"the acting Superintendent of Schools recognize the universal desire
of the American people to end the war in Vietnam. We also recognize
that there are differences among the people and their leaders as to how
this can best be achieved."' The Board declared that "[a]ll schools will
be open October 15, but the school system recognizes the rights of those
teachers and pupils who wish, as a matter of conscience, to participate
in planned programs outside the schools." 2 To implement this recognition, the Board declared that,
[t]he absence of pupils will be recorded, but they will not be
penalized for their absence. Teachers may charge the day against
their personal business allowance, provided they notify their super3
visors in advance.
Petitioners, a junior high school student and his mother, sought
an order directing the Board "to hold classes as usual on October 15,
1969 and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate." 4 The court
upheld petitioners' demands and ordered that respondent "issue a statement or directive rescinding its statement or directive of October 8,
1969 and also stating that the public schools will conduct their usual
and normal school day on October 15, 1969." 5
In affirming petitioners' contentions and making this order, the
Richmond County Supreme Court, 6 a court of first instance, based its
decision on three points. The first was that the Board's order was in
violation of petitioners' rights under the first and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution, specifically, the guarantee of free
expression. 7 The second point was that the Board lacked the power to
determine what was or was not a national issue of sufficient importance
1 Nistad v. Board of Educ., 304 N.Y.S.2d 971, 975 (Sup. Ct. Richmond Cty. 1969).
2 N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1969, at 5, col. 5.
3 Id.
4 304 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
5 Id. at 976.
6 Opinion authored by Justice Vito J. Titone.
7 304 N.Y.S.2d at 973-74.
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to allow students' and teachers' absences.8 The final point was that those
students who did attend school on "Moratorium Day" might lack sufficient supervision because of the absence of teachers. 9
Underlying all three of these issues was the question of the rights
of students and teachers to express their opinions through speech or
actions, "and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."' 1
The court here based its decision on those rights, saying that within
the Board's directive allowing absences of students and teachers,
[t]he element of compulsion is clear. Students and teachers who do
not attend school that day will be deemed to be against the Government's Viet Nam War policy, and those who attend will be
assumed to favor such policy. It forces people to take a position
when, as a matter of constitutional law, they are not required to
do so."
The court based this proposition on the authority of Board of
Education v. Barnette.12 That case dealt with the state board's right to
force pupils to recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag. The Barnette
Court held that the board could not do so, because compelling that act
would violate the students' first amendment right to free speech. In
the instant case the court cited the words of Mr. Justice Murphy's concurring opinion in Barnette as being pertinent;
[t]he right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by
the Constitution against State action includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. .... 13
Both before and after Barnette, the courts have consistently held
that the first amendment right to free speech applies to public schools.
This right to free expression has included the right to wear black armbands to school in order to exhibit the students' disapproval of the
Vietnam War, 14 as well as the wearing of freedom buttons by students
during school hours. 15 Earlier cases held that freedom of speech under
the first amendment included the teaching of a foreign language. 16 Before Barnette, state courts followed the Supreme Court's decision in
8 Id. at 975.

9 Id. at 974.
10 U.S. CoNsr., amend. I.
11 304 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
12 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
13 Id. at 645 (concurring opinion).
14 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
15 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (the buttons contained the words
"One Man One Vote" and "SNCC').
16 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1925).
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Minersville School Districtv. Gobitis' which held that forcing students
to salute the flag was not unconstitutional.' 8 Since Barnette, those same
courts have refused to enforce such compulsory activity when students
objected on religious grounds.' 9
Teachers' rights, as to what they believe and what they teach, are
also protected under the first amendment. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that loyalty oaths or requirements that teachers reveal
the organizations to which they belong are unconstitutional, either
because of vagueness or because they violate the right to free speech
and association. 2° State courts have not been as consistent in protecting
2
teachers against dismissal for their political beliefs. '
In the instant case, the court advanced this requirement of free
speech one step further than the previous decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. By explicitly allowing students and teachers
to exercise their rights of free speech and assembly without penalty, the
Board has, according to the court, overstepped its bounds. The court
17

310 U.S. 586 (1940) (overruled by Barnette).

18 People ex rel. Fish v. Sandstrom, 279 N.Y. 523, 18 N.E.2d 840 (1939) (flag raising

ceremony); accord, In re Latrecchia, 128 N.J.L. 472, 26 A.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (Jehovah's
Witness may be forced to salute flag); Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 117 N.J.L. 455, 189
A. 629 (Sup. Ct. 1937), afl'd, 118 N.J.L. 566, 194 A. 177 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937) appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 303 U.S. 624 (1937) (flag salute).
19 Lewis v. Allen, 5 Misc. 2d 68, 159 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1957), aff'd, 11
App. Div. 2d 447, 207 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1960), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 867, 200 N.E2d 767, 252
N.Y.S.2d 80, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 923 (1964) (voluntary flag salute with no penalty for
refusal is constitutional); accord, Holden v. Board of Educ., 46 N.J. 281, 216 A.2d 387
(1966) (Black Muslims may not be forced to salue the flag); cf. Baer v. Kolmorgen, 14
Misc. 2d 1015, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cty. 1958) (refused to separate
church and state with regard to a nativity scene on school property); N.J. STAT. ANN.
18A:36-3 (1968) (requiring flag salute except for those with conscientious scruples who
shall stand at attention).
20 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960) (both cases holding that mere membership in the Communist Party is not
sufficient basis for dismissal); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (loyalty oath unconstitutional because too vague, uncertain, and broad). But see Adler v. Board of Educ.
342 U.S. 485 (1952) (mere membership in Communist Party held to be sufficient grounds
for dismissal; Keyishian, supra, held not controlled by Adler).
21 Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806 (1950), aff'd sub noma., Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); McDowell v. Board of Educ., 104 Misc. 564, 172
N.Y.S. 590 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1918) (Quaker's dismissal because of views on World War
I upheld); accord, Laba v. Board of Educ., 23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957) (mere membership held sufficient grounds for dismissal); Thorp v. Board of Trustees, 6 N.J. 498, 79
A.2d 462 (1951), vacated on other grounds, 342 U.S. 803 (1951) (loyalty oath held constitutional); cf. Lowenstein v. Board of Educ. 35 N.J. 94, 171 A.2d 265 (1961) (teacher's
dismissal reversed on other grounds but opinion contains full discussion of loyalty oaths).
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. 18A:6-10 (1968) (dismissal for "inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other just cause . . . .'); N.Y. EDUC. LAws, §§ 3021-22 (McKinney
1953) (grounds for dismissal discussed in Thompson, supra).
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said that the Board's directive giving students and teachers the right to
free speech is, in effect, a compulsion to speak. At that point the case
veered from previous decisions and posed the unique question whether
the explicit allowance of free speech can become the compulsion to
speak.
Directly related to the court's first reason for its decision was its
second point, that the Board has no power to decide what national
issues merit a day of allowed absences. The court based this contention
on the authority of Engel v. Vitale,22 wherein the Supreme Court held
that a state may not compose a prayer to be said voluntarily at the
opening of the school day, because that would be in violation of the
first amendment's prohibition against "establishment of religion." By
allowing the Board to determine the merit of national issues, the Nistad
court apparently felt that the same dangers present in the school prayer
would be present in the national issue, that "[t]his determination would
depend upon the political outlook of the board members at a particular
time." 23 Engel is consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court
which hold that the separation between church and state must be complete. 24 Although the Nistad court cited no authority that the separation
between national issues and the schools must be as complete as that
between church and state, it has indicated that that must indeed be
the case. Just as religion must be kept separate from the schools, so
must controversial national issues. The court declared that "[g]overnment may not thus involve itself in such controversial matters or moral
issues."' 25 Quoting from a New York State Education Department opinion, the court observed that "nothing that will tend to foster intolerance, bigotry, animosity or dissension should be allowed to inject itself
26
into the public school system of this great state."
At this point, the court's argument leads directly into the third
basis of the decision, that the involvement of the Board in such a controversial issue will cause harm to the school system. The court, in fact,
found three types of harm that would come to the school system if the
22 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
23 304 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
24 See Chamberlin v. Public Instr. Bd., 377 U.S. 402 (1964) (school prayer); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (school prayer). Compare Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952) (released time from school for voluntary sectarian education held
constitutional) with McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (voluntary sectarian
education in the school building held unconstitutional). See also Everson v. Board of Educ.
330 U.S. 1 (1947) (reimbursing parochial school children for bus costs held constitutional).
25 304 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
26 Appeal of A.C.L.U., 36 State Dept. Rep. 87, 97 (N.Y. Educ. Dept. 1926) (use of
school auditorium for political meeting), quoted at 304 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
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Board's order were allowed to stand. First, the chance of lack of supervision "and the real possibility of demonstrators, picket lines, and the
like', in school areas." 27 Secondly, the court observed that to allow absence on this one day would give students the impression "that they
have total freedom, by official edict, to move about and participate in
whatever they, in 'good conscience,' feel right (sic) at any time, and
absent themselves from school in so doing. ' 28 The final harm would be
to the students themselves because "a prospective employer could check
specifically to determine whether or not a person was absent on this
highly publicized day, October 15, 1969, and might draw an inference
about that person's politics.''29
In the last analysis, the court's decision was based solely upon the
rights of students and teachers to free expression under the first amendment. The precise question presented was, if the use of those rights is
specifically and explicitly allowed by the Board, should that use then be
curtailed by the same constitutional provision which had created those
rights? Does the Board's directive specifically allowing students to exercise their rights cause such compulsion so that those rights must then
be curtailed? The court answered these questions in the affirmative.
Examining its reasons for doing so discloses that those reasons are not,
in fact, based on law, and that the right to free expression should be
allowed, explicitly or implicitly.
The court's first reason, that the allowance of free speech may become the compulsion to speak, points up the precariousness of the first
amendment right. How should that right be applied to society so that
the individual will feel free to speak or not to speak? The balance
point may be, as the court indicated, that allowance becomes compulsion only when, as in the instant case, it is an explicit allowance. But,
that is indeed a nebulous distinction. The decisions in Tinker v. Des
Moines School District,30 Burnside v. Byars,31 and Barnette forbade
those school boards from disallowing free expression. Do not the courtforced allowances of free expression in those cases compel speech in
the same way as in the instant case? Allowing some students to wear
armbands, as in Tinker, permits the implication that those who do not
wear the armband do not support the demonstrator's cause. Those
who do not wear the freedom buttons, as in Burnside, impliedly do not
stand for whatever the buttons stand for, regardless of their true beliefs.
27 304 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
28

Id. at 976.

29 Id.

30 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
31 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
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It is clear that the balance point is in the wrong place; compulsion
exists whether the allowance of free expression is explicit or implicit.
Many people listening to a soapbox orator feel bound by human nature
to declare their agreement or disagreement verbally. The orator's words
have compelled the listener's retort; the former's use of his right to
free expression has compelled the listener to speak. Thus, this first basis
of the court's decision is not sufficient reason to deny students and
teachers their constitutional right to free expression. That right cannot be balanced on the mere fact that the Board had issued a specific
directive. To balance it there would be to invite an examination into
every instance where free speech is allowed in order to determine if
compulsion exists. Some compulsion exists in all cases where free speech
is allowed; to deny it in one place merely because of an explicit allowance would place too great a strain on that right. The right to free
expression is too important to American democracy to be constrained
by artificial and unworkable boundaries.
The second basis of the court's decision also falls short of the
point where free expression can be curtailed in the schools. The court
cites no authority on which to base its contention that national issues
and the schools must be as separate as church and state. The establishment of religion is not so similar to the establishment of national issues.
Obviously, a school system must teach current events in its classes; to
that extent, the teachers must be allowed to teach and talk about national issues. The Supreme Court of the United States has protected
the teacher's right to discuss controversial issues without being removed
for treason or sedition. 32 The true arguments for separating the schools
from controversial national issues are revealed in the court's third basis
for its decision.
In this third area, that the introduction of controversial issues into
the school would cause harm and disruption, the court is on more solid
ground. Forbidding first amendment rights to free expression has been
allowed where there is a showing of harm or disruption.3 3 But, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that there must be a showing that
there will be disruption or harm before the right to freedom of speech
can be curtailed;
[f]reedom of speech, though not absolute .

.

. is nevertheless pro-

tected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to
32 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

33 Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968) (student with Beatle
haircut); Blackwell v. Issaquena Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (protest
buttons); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968)
(blocking entrance to school building).
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produce a- clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
3 4
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.
This requirement of a clear and present danger applies to schools as
well as to students3 3 and teachers.3 6 Both Tinker and Burnside hold
that a showing of disruption is necessary in order to allow a curtailment
of a student's right to free expression, even though other cases have
held that the "state's authority over children's activities is broader than
37
over like actions of adults."
But, in the instant case, there is no showing of a clear and present
danger of disruption and harm in allowing the students to demonstrate
out of school. There has been no showing by the court that there will
be a disruption of classes as was necessary in Tinker and Burnside. The
only harm shown is that "[a]n implication might arise, contrary to state
law, that attendance in school is secondary to their right to participate
in causes morally worthwhile in their minds."3 a This implication falls
short of the degree necessary to allow curtailment of the students' and
teachers' rights to free expression.
In each case they [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.3 9
The facts in the instant case do not meet that test.
34 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948) (breach of peace statute); accord,
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (federal conspiracy statute); Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (loyalty oath for union officers); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (breach of peace statute); cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969), overruling Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (statute unconstitutional if
it forbids mere assembly to advocate a particular action).
35 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d
744 (5th Cir. 1966).
36 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (loyalty oath).
37 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (minor prohibited from selling
magazines on the street); accord, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (sale of
obscene magazines to minors prohibited).
88 304 N.Y.S.2d at 976; see N.Y. Enuc. LAws, §§ 3205, 3210 (McKinney 1953) (compulsory attendance statutes).
39 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), afJ'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

